Pierce v. McMullen Appellant\u27s Reply Brief Dckt. 40368 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
7-25-2013
Pierce v. McMullen Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt.
40368
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"Pierce v. McMullen Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 40368" (2013). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 4185.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/4185
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
JOSEPH PIERCE, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
STEVE MCMULLEN, HIGHLAND 
FINANCIAL, LLC, 
Respondents. 
And 
JOHN DOES 1-10, 
Defendants. 
I 
I APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
I Supreme Court Docket No. 40368-2012 
Kootenai DC Docket # CV -09-10418 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE 
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
HONORABLE JOHN MITCHELL 
DISTRICT JUDGE, PRESIDING 
MELANIE E. BAILLIE 
J ames, Vernon & Weeks, P.A. 
1626 Lincoln Way 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant Pierce 
STEVEN MCMULLEN 
P.O. Box 35lO 
Post Falls, ID 83877 
Pro Se Defendant 
I. TABLE OF CONTENTS 
II. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................................. ii 
III. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................... 1 
IV. ARGUMENT ....................................................................................................................... 2 
A. MCMULLEN ATTEMPTS TO RAISE NEW ISSUES FOR THE FIRST TIME ON 
APPEAL ..................................................................................................................................... 2 
1. McMullen's Challenge to Jurisdiction Was Waived .................................................... 3 
2. McMullen's Evidentiary Objections are Misplaced ..................................................... 4 
3. McMullen is Not Entitled to Protection from the LLC ................................................ 5 
4. Respondent Has Provided No Authority for His Contention that the Accusations 
Against Him Were False ......................................................................................................... 6 
5. McMullen Does Not Have a Counterclaim for Damages against Pierce ..................... 6 
B. MCMULLEN'S BRIEF DOES NOT COMPLY WITH IDAHO APPELLATE RULE 
35(b)(6) ....................................................................................................................................... 7 
C. RESPONDENT'S CONTENTIONS ARE UNSUPPORTED BY THE RECORD ......... 8 
D. THE IDAHO CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT IS APPLICABLE TO MCMULLEN 
AND HIGHLAND'S ACTIVITIES .......................................................................................... 12 
V. CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................... 13 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 1 
II. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Cement Masons'-Employers' Trust v. Davis, 107 Idaho 1131,695 P.2d 1270 (Ct.App.1985) ...... 5 
City o/Meridian v. Petra, Inc., 154 Idaho 425, 299 P.3d 232 (2013) ........................................ 1, 7 
In re Wiggins, 273 B.R. 839 (D. Idaho 2001) ......................................................................... 12, 13 
Kyle v. Beco Corp., 109 Idaho 267, 272, 707 P.2d 378,383 (1985) .............................................. 1 
Lohman v. Flynn, 139 Idaho 312, 78 P.3d 379 (2003) ................................................................... 3 
Murray v. Spalding, 141 Idaho 99, 106 P.3d 425 (2005) ............................................................... 2 
Parsons v. Mutual O/Enumclaw Ins. Co., 143 Idaho 743, 152 P.3d 614 (2007) ....................... 1,2 
Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. V MRI Associates, LLP, 148 Idaho 479, 494, 224 P.3d 
1068, 1083 (2009) ....................................................................................................................... 4 
Suitts v. Nix, 141 Idaho 706, 709, 117 P.3d 120, 123 (2005) ......................................................... 1 
Telford v. Nye, 154 Idaho 606, 301 P.3d 264 (2013) ...................................................................... 2 
Statutes 
I.C. § 30-6-304 ................................................................................................................................ 5 
I.C. §30-6-1 04(1) ............................................................................................................................ 5 
Rules 
Id. R. App. P. 35(b) ......................................................................................................................... 7 
Id. R. App. P. 35(b)(6) .................................................................................................................... 7 
Id. R. Civ. P. 12(b) .......................................................................................................................... 6 
Id. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(4) ..................................................................................................................... 3 
Id. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5) ..................................................................................................................... 3 
Id. R. Civ. P. 15(a) .......................................................................................................................... 6 
Id. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(I) ....................................................................................................................... 3 
Id. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(2) ....................................................................................................................... 3 
Id. R. Civ. P. 4(i) ............................................................................................................................. 3 
Id. R. Civ. P. 8(b) ............................................................................................................................ 6 
Id. R. Civ. P. 8(d) ............................................................................................................................ 6 
Id. R. Evid. 801(d)(2) ...................................................................................................................... 4 
APPELLANT'S REPL Y BRIEF 11 
III. INTRODUCTION 
McMullen had every opportunity to meaningfully engage in the underlying litigation in 
this matter including attending trial and presenting evidence and testimony to support his 
position, but he chose not to do so. Neither Respondent Steve McMullen nor Highland 
Financial (hereinafter collectively "McMullen") raised any issues at trial in the underlying 
litigation. A default was entered for their failure to appear at trial. Tr. p. 55, L. 16. Nonetheless, 
McMullen impermissibly attempts to raise new issues for the first time in this appeal. Parsons v. 
Mutual Of Enumclaw Ins. Co., 143 Idaho 743,152 P.3d 614 (2007). 
McMullen also attempts to introduce his own facts and evidence, but does not cite to the 
record as required by the appellate rules. See City of Meridian v. Petra, Inc., 154 Idaho 425, 299 
P.3d 232 (2013). Even more concerning than not citing to the record, is that McMullen recites 
pages of "facts," and "evidence" that simply do not exist in the record at all. 
While McMullen is absolutely free to represent himself in this appeal, and has every right 
to submit a brief and argue his position, he must do so on the same terms as every other litigant. 
Pro se litigants are held to the same standards and rules as those represented by an attorney. 
Suitts v. Nix, 141 Idaho 706, 117 P.3d 120 (2005). McMullen was made aware of his 
responsibility to have a "working knowledge of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Idaho case 
law and Idaho statutes that might be applicable." Suppl. Tr., p. 5, L. 6-16. McMullen 
acknowledged his understanding of that responsibility. Suppl. Tr., p. 5, L. 17. 
McMullen has chosen to represent himself throughout the course of this litigation and 
appeal, thus he must do so pursuant to the rules. l McMullen has failed materially to follow any 
of the rules in his responsive brief. Thus, his brief should not be considered in this appeal. 
1 McMullen also attempted to represent Highland Financial, LLC, which he is barred from doing because McMullen 
is not a licensed Idaho attorney. Kyle v. Beco Corp., 109 Idaho 267,272, 707 P.2d 378,383 (1985). 
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IV. ARGUMENT 
A. MCMULLEN ATTEMPTS TO RAISE NEW ISSUES FOR THE FIRST TIME ON 
APPEAL 
Issues that are not raised in the trial court will not be considered for the first time on 
appeal. Telford v. Nye, 154 Idaho 606, 301 P.3d 264 (2013). "The longstanding rule of this 
Court is that we will not consider issues that are raised for the first time on appeal." Parsons v. 
Mutual Of Enumclaw Ins. Co., 143 Idaho 743, 152 P.3d 614 (2007) citing Murray v. Spalding, 
141 Idaho 99, 106 P.3d 425 (2005). 
In this case, McMullen raises at least five issues for the first time on appeal. First, 
McMullen asserts that he did not have notice of the first complaint that was filed against him 
and, thus, did not have notice of the default 'judgment." Respondent's Brief, p. 3, L. 7-10. 
Second, McMullen makes an evidentiary objection for the first time when he asserts that 
the trial court allowed hearsay testimony. Respondent's Brief, p. 11, L. 2-4. 
Third, McMullen argues for the first time that he is entitled to the protection of the 
limited liability of Highland, LLC, and that he should not be personally liable, and should be 
dismissed from the litigation. Respondent's Brief, p. 12, L. 14-19. 
Fourth, McMullen attempts to argue that he was "falsely" accused of being a scam and 
"illegitimate." Respondent's Brief, p. 4, L. 11. 
Fifth, McMullen seeks damages on behalf of himself and Highland Financial, LLC, for 
(1) loss of work; (2) loss of profit and income due to Pierce's alleged "interference" while 
Highland was attempting to sell the Providence Lake Property; (3) emotional damages; (4) 
slander damages; (5) court costs and fees. Respondent's Brief, p. 13, L. 1-6. 
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1. McMullen's Challenge to Jurisdiction Was Waived 
Whether McMullen is challenging the propriety of service by publication of the initial 
complaint, or whether McMullen is challenging the personal jurisdiction of the Court to enter 
default, makes no difference. Both arguments are being raised for the first time on appeal and 
should not be considered. Even if the arguments were to be considered, they fail. 
Service may be had by publication pursuant to Id. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(1). Service by 
publication is complete upon the date of the last publication. Id. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(2). There is no 
evidence in the record that service of the complaint by publication was not properly executed or 
completed. McMullen was subsequently personally served with the amended complaint, but did 
not raise insufficiency of service of the prior complaint in his responsive pleading. R., pp. 98-
100. McMullen did not file a motion arguing insufficient service process which is required 
under the Idaho civil rules. Id. R. Civ. P. 12(b )(5). 
Likewise, a jurisdictional challenge must be made by motion. Id. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(4). 
Nonetheless, the filing of a notice of appearance by a party constitutes submission to the personal 
jurisdiction of the court. Id. R. Civ. P. 4(i). Thus, the voluntary appearance by a party is 
equivalent to service of the summons upon that party_ Lohman v. Flynn, 139 Idaho 312, 78 P.3d 
379 (2003). 
McMullen's challenge to personal jurisdiction was waived by his voluntary appearance in 
the case. R. p. 93. McMullen entered a general appearance, submitting himself to the 
jurisdiction of the court. 
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2. McMullen's Evidentiary Objections are Misplaced 
McMullen argues that certain "hearsay" evidence was improperly admitted at trial. 
Resp.'s Brief, p. 11, L. 4; p. 12, L. 7? By failing to object to the evidence offered at trial, the 
objection is waived. Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. V MRI Associates, LLP, 148 Idaho 
479, 494, 224 P.3d 1068, 1083 (2009). There were no objections made at trial to any admitted 
testimony. 
McMullen challenges Amy ~s Birge's testimony as hearsay when she testified that 
there were "at least six others" she knew of who had complaints about McMullen. The exact 
testimony is as follows: 
I had about a half dozen people contact me and also collaborate - or not 
collaborate but let me know that the same thing was happening to them, and they 
wanted to know what should they do or how was I handling the situation because 
they were also being, um, taken advantage of by Highland Financial. 
Tr. p. 117, L. 17-25. 
The evidence is not hearsay, and even if it was, McMullen failed to object to its 
admission at trial. Of course, McMullen had an opportunity to make objections to proffered 
testimony and to cross examine Ms. Birge himself, which he chose not to do. His objection to 
Amy Birge's testimony is waived. 
The other evidence McMullen claims is hearsay is Pierce's testimony regarding 
McMullen's statements. Resp.'s Brief, p. 12, L. 8-9. However, statements of a party opponent 
are not hearsay. Id. R. Evid. 801 (d)(2). Therefore, statements and representations made by 
McMullen to Pierce are clearly admissible. 
2 McMullen claims that "At no time did Highland tell Amy Birge, Pierce or anybody else including the 'at least 6 
others' page 30 line 6 per Pierces [sic] counsel, to not contact their lender." Resp's Brief., p. 11, L. 1-4. The 
confusion lies with McMullen's quote to Appellant's counsel, as Pierce does not state on page 30, line 6 of his brief 
that McMullen told Amy Birge (or anyone else) "not to contact their lender." 
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3. McMullen is Not Entitled to Protection from the LLC 
McMullen asserts that Highland Financial LLC is a separate entity and, pursuant to Idaho 
law, its managers are entitled to limited liability. Respondent's Brief, p. 12, L. 12. McMullen 
further claims that the "contract" Pierce entered into was with Highland Financial, LLC, and not 
McMullen personally. Therefore, McMullen is not liable for any damages to Pierce. 
Respondent's Brief, P. 12, L. 16. McMullen seeks dismissal from the case. 
While it is true that a properly formed limited liability company under the Idaho Uniform 
Limited Liability Company Act is separate and distinct from its members or managers (I.C. §30-
6-104(1)), such separate distinction does not prevent suit against a member or manager for his or 
her own wrongful acts. I.C. § 30-6-304, Uniform Law Comments, Subsection (a)(2). 
Of course, McMullen did not raise the issue of his own limited liability in either the 
pleadings or at trial. Both highland Financial LLC and McMullen were defaulted for their failure 
to appear at trial in the matter. R. p. 98. 
On default, "all well pleaded factual allegations in the complaint are deemed admitted," 
Cement Masons'-Employers' Trust v. Davis, 107 Idaho 1131, 1132, 695 P.2d 1270, 1271 
(Ct.App.1985). McMullen was defaulted at the beginning of trial for his failure to appear and 
defend at trial. Tr. p. 55, L. 16-17. 
Pierce pled that Highland Financial, LLC was the alter ego of McMullen in his amended 
complaint. R. p. 87. McMullen did not deny the allegation in his answer. R. p. 98. A failure to 
deny an averment in a pleading deems it admitted: 
Averments in a pleading to which a responsive pleading is required, other than 
those as to the amount of damage, are admitted when not denied in the responsive 
pleading, except those necessary to sustain an action for divorce. Averments in a 
pleading to which no responsive pleading is required or permitted shall be taken 
as denied or avoided. 
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Id. R. Civ. P. 8(d). 
An amended complaint requires a responsive pleading. Id. R. Civ. P. 8(b). McMullen 
filed an answer to the amended complaint but failed to deny the averment that Highland 
Financial LLC was the alter ego of McMullen. Moreover, McMullen's answer was stricken at 
the start of trial for his failure to appear and defend. Tr. 55, L. 16-17. Highland never filed an 
answer to either the original complaint or the amended complaint. For all the foregoing reasons, 
McMullen cannot now attempt for the first time on appeal to assert his limited liability in this 
case. 
4. Respondent Has Provided No Authority for His Contention that the Accusations 
Against Him Were False 
McMullen claims in his brief that Pierce made "false accusations" against him in the 
course of this litigation. However, McMullen did not respond to Pierce's accusations with either 
affirmative defenses our counterclaims. R. p. 98. Rather McMullen answered the amended 
complaint and only denied the allegations related to punitive damages. R. p. 98. McMullen did 
not show up at trial to defend against Pierce's allegations. Tr. p. 52, L. 5. McMullen cannot 
now, for the first time on appeal, claim that Pierce made false allegations against him. 
5. McMullen Does Not Have a Counterclaim for Damages against Pierce 
Idaho Civil Rule 12(b) requires that a counterclaim be asserted in a responsive pleading: 
Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any pleading, whether a 
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the 
responsive pleading thereto if one is required ... 
Id. R. Civ. P. 12(b) 
While the court is to liberally grant an amendment to pleadings "when justice so 
requires," (Id. R. Civ. P. 15(a)), a request to amend a pleading must be by motion to the trial 
court. Id. Of course, McMullen never filed a motion to amend his answer to add any 
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counterclaims. Rather, McMullen, for the first time in his Response brief on appeal, asserts 
counterclaims against Pierce. Respondent's Brief, p. 13. McMullen's counterclaims are 
unsupported by law, fact or the record in this matter and should be stricken. 
B. MCMULLEN'S BRIEF DOES NOT COMPLY WITH IDAHO APPELLATE RULE 
35 (b) (6) 
Pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 35(b), a response brief must contain certain particulars: 
The argument shall contain the contentions of the respondent with respect to the 
issues presented on appeal, the reasons therefor, with citations to the authorities, 
statutes and parts of the transcript and record relied upon. 
Id. R. App. P. 35(b)(6) 
It is not the job of the Court to "go fishing" through the record. City of Meridian v. 
Petra, Inc., 154 Idaho 425, _. 299 P.3d 232, 258 (2013). In the Petra case, the City of 
Meridian referred in its briefing to the 160,000 pages that comprised the case's record. The 
City, like McMullen in this case, makes a plethora of arguments to support his position. 
However, like the City, McMullen fails to cite to the record to support his arguments. The Court 
made it clear in the Petra case that rather than have to search in the record, it simply would not 
consider the unsupported argument on appeal. Id. 
McMullen's brief fails to contain any citation to authorities, statutes, and parts of the 
transcript and record he relies upon as required by Id. R. App. P. 35(b)(6), to support his 
arguments. The only citations to which McMullen points are a few references to Appellant's 
brief. The references in Appellant's brief to which McMullen's points generally do not support 
h· 3 IS arguments. 
3 McMullen's cites to Appellant's brief are as follows: Respondent's brief, p. 2, L. 23 (this reference does not 
support McMullen's argument); p. 3, L. 16 (misquotes Appellant counsel), L. 23 (this reference supports 
McMullen's statement of fact that there is a rise in mortgage rescue companies); p. 4, L. 12 (this reference does not 
support McMullen's factual assertion that he was falsely accused in the past, but does support his statement that 
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McMullen makes reference to documents and testimony in his brief, but he does not cite 
to them. McMullen's arguments that are unsupported by citations to the record should not be 
considered in this appeal. 
C. RESPONDENT'S CONTENTIONS ARE UNSUPPORTED BY THE RECORD 
This Court will not consider issues cited on appeal that are not supported by the law, 
authority or argument. City of Meridian v. Petra, Inc., 154 Idaho 425, 299 P.3d 232(2013). "If 
the issue is only mentioned in passing and not supported by any cogent argument or authority, it 
cannot be considered by this Court." City of Meridian v. Petra, Inc., 154 Idaho 425, 299 P.3d 
232(2013) citing Liponis v. Bach, 149 Idaho 372, 374,234 P.3d 696,698 (2010). 
McMullen cites a litany of facts in his brief, most of which cannot be found in the record. 
McMullen also makes arguments for which he provides no legal authority. Pierce will highlight 
the material facts asserted by McMullen which Pierce believes are clearly not supported in the 
record. 
First, McMullen claims that Highland agreed to purchase the property by paying $20,000. 
Respondent's Brief, p. 2; p. 9, and then "made monthly payments of $2501.35." Resp.'s Brief, 
p. 10. However, there is no evidence to support McMullen's contentions that he made any 
payments beyond the $11,000 that Pierce testified he paid to Pierce's lender. Tr. p. 84, L. 12. 
McMullen additionally asserts that Highland purchased Pierce's property to stop the 
foreclosure. Resp.'s Brief, p. 3. The record does not support McMullen's contention that he 
purchased the property. In fact, Pierce testified that he received no money from McMullen for 
the property; (Tr. 19, L. 2) that the loan remained in Pierce's name; (Tr. p. 72, L. 1) and that at 
Amy Birge accused Highland of being illegitimate and a scam); p. 8, L. 5 (this reference supports his statement that 
"Highland's contracts are lengthy"); p. 11, L. 3 (this reference misquotes Appellant's counsel); 
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the time he signed the documents with McMullen that he did not believe he was transferring all 
of his interest in the property to McMullen. Tr. p. 77, L. 19-23. 
Also troubling is McMullen's contention that the Attorney General's investigation of 
Highland that led to a consent decree was not related to his activities respecting Amy Birge. 
Resp's Brief, p. 4.4 McMullen claims that he was "falsely accused" by Ms. Birge. McMullen 
claims that the attorney general found nothing wrong with Highland's business practices as they 
related to Birge. Resp.'s Brief, p. 5, L. 9. The evidence in the record, however, is that Amy 
Birge testified the attorney general investigated McMullen and fined him as a result of her 
complaint. Tr. p. 116, L. 10. 
McMullen goes on in his brief to discuss the course of the proceedings with the attorney 
general's investigation, that it reviewed all of Highland's documents, and that "Highland was 
very compliant ... " Resp.'s Brief, pp. 4-5. According to McMullen's self-serving and 
unsupported argument in his response brief, the attorney general's concern was that Highland 
"advertised a FREE car with the purchase of a home." Resp.'s Brief, p. 5, L. 12. None of the 
facts cited on pages 5 and 6 of the respondent's brief is supported by the record. Although 
superfluous to this appeal, McMullen references a consumer pamphlet produced by the Attorney 
General's office after it investigated McMullen which is also not part of the record in this case. 
McMullen goes on to assert the type of business in which Highland Financial is engaged 
(Resp.'s Brief, pp. 7-8), and that all of the documents that Pierce signed were "required by law 
are favorable and informative to Pierce as they refer to Pierce to contact an attorney before 
signing anything ... " Resp.' s Brief, p. 8. A review of the documents in the record, however, tells 
a much different story. 
4 Although unfortunately not a part of this record despite having asked the court to take judicial notice of it, (Tr. p. 
47, L. 20) and the court refusing, Respondent entered into a consent decree with the attorney general which was 
approved by the district court. Tr. p. 47, L. 20. 
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Trial Exhibits 1,2,3,5,6,16,17,18, 19,20,21, and 22 say nothing about seeking the 
advice of an attorney. Trial Exhibits 4, 15, and Exhibit H mention attorney advice, but not in the 
context McMullen contends. 
Trial Exhibit 4 is a "limited power of attorney" that grants certain authority to the 
"trustee" of the trust (Trial Exhibit 2) in which Pierce is the beneficiary and the Providence Lake 
property is the corpus. The language of that limited power of attorney states that "if there is 
anything about this form that you do not understand, you should ask a lawyer to explain it to 
you." Trial Exhibit 4, p. 1. 
Trial Exhibit 15, entitled "subject to and equity disclosure," refers to asking a lender or 
an attorney to determine whether a "due on sale" clause is contained in the loan documents, what 
such a clause actually states, and "what actions they will take if you enter into a sale agreement 
with us." Trial Exh. 15, p. 1. 
Finally, the only other document that refers Pierce to contact an attorney is found in 
Exhibit H, which was submitted in support of Pierce's motion for a new trial. The specific 
document referred to is entitled "options you may consider." Exh. H. The document is a two-
page, single spaced list of 8 "options you may consider" presumably if a person is facing 
foreclosure. s One of the options is "talk with your family, friends, accountant, pastor or 
attorney." Exh. H. 
The record does not support McMullen's contention that the litany of documents he 
provided to Pierce was "favorable and informative to Pierce" (Resp. 's Brief, p. 8. L. 17), or that 
they "refer to Pierce to contact an attorney before signing anything ... " Resp. 's Brief, p. 8. L. 18. 
Additionally, contrary to McMullen's assertion, the record does not support his contention that 
"Highland has gone way out of its way and told Pierce and any other sellers to contact many 
5 Notably, 4 of the 8 options include the involvement of Highland Financial. 
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other people such as ... HUD and other state and federal agencies in its various marketing 
material and contracts. All of which are in writing." Resp.' s Brief, p. 11, L. 11. There is 
nothing in the record that supports McMullen's contention that Highland referred anyone to 
HUD OR any state or federal agencies. 
In an attempt to justify his confusing and convoluted transaction, McMullen asserts that 
the documents that were put to Pierce were reviewed by several attorneys and the attorney 
general "to ensure compliance with all applicable laws." Resp.'s Brief, p. 9. McMullen claims 
that "tens of thousands of dollars" were spent for this purpose. Resp.'s Brief, p. 9, L. 6. None 
of the facts McMullen asserts about the compliance and propriety of his forms is in the record. 
Moreover, these facts are not relevant to this appeal. 
The documents that comprise the transaction must be taken, not in a vacuum as 
McMullen suggests, but as a whole. McMullen argues that "Highland's contracts are not 
ambiguous or misleading." As is fully briefed in Pierce's Appellant's Brief at pp. 30-36, the 
facts and evidence in the record clearly show the contract entered into between Pierce and 
McMullen was not a simple contract for McMullen to purchase Pierce's property. 
In what seems to be a consistent theme for McMullen, he again makes a statement of fact, 
unsupported by the record, claiming on page 10 of his brief that Pierce had "5 days to rescind 
any contract signed." Resp.'s Brief, p. 10, L. 5. The "Contract for Purchase and Sale," (Trial 
Exhibit 1), does not give Pierce 5 days to rescind. None of the other documents comprising the 
parties' contract have a five day rescission clause either. The only document that references 
Pierce's ability to cancel the contract is Trial Exhibit 20, entitled "Right to Cancel." That 
document provides that if Pierce "retains the services of any other party other than Highland 
Financial [Pierce] agree[s] to pay Highland Financial LLC the hourly rate of $150.00 and hour 
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with a one hour minimum." Trial Exh. 2. Nowhere in that document does it provide Pierce with 
5 days to cancel as McMullen asserts in his brief at page 10, line 5. Facts and argument not 
supported by the record should not be considered. In this case, almost all of McMullen's brief is 
unsupported by the record. 
D. THE IDAHO CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT IS APPLICABLE TO 
MCMULLEN AND HIGHLAND'S ACTIVITIES 
The thrust of McMullen's argument (erroneously advanced by the trial court) is that 
Highland is a purchaser not a seller and, therefore, is not liable under the Idaho Consumer 
Protection Act. Resp.'s Brief, p. 10. As the U.S. District Court made persuasively clear in the 
case of In re Wiggins, 273 B.R. 839 (D. Idaho 2001), and Pierce fully briefed (Appellant's Brief, 
pp. 22-27), sellers of money are not "purchasers" and are subject to the Idaho Consumer 
Protection Act. Additionally, McMullen's own documents indicate that Highland is furnishing 
services. See Trial Exhibit 14; 20. 
Trial Exhibit 14, "options to consider" provides that Highland "may be able to work a 
short sale for you"; "We can assist you in selling your home"; "we can make you cash offer and 
close quickly usually in two to five days"; "if we buy your home we might be able to come to a 
rental agreement with you to say [sic] in your home and rent. Then you can work on your credit 
through our contacts so you are able to purchase the home back. You could stay in your home!" 
Trial Exh. 14 (emphasis in original). 
Equally important, McMullen states in his brief that the attorney general found a 
consumer protection violation as a result of Highland's business practices. Resp. 's Brief, p. 5, L. 
16. Although he proclaims his innocence, he does not challenge the Attorney General's 
important finding: that the Idaho Consumer Protection Act applies to McMullen and Highland's 
activities. 
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Finally, a review of Trial Exhibit 15 supports the analysis that Highland is "selling 
money." In addition to the "hold harmless" clause, the document states: "you understand that 
you are selling all or part of [your] equity ... " Trial Exh. 15. A "sale" of equity by a distressed 
land owner is not an arms' length "sale" of the property. Just as in Wiggins case, McMullen was 
selling cash to Pierce. 
V. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the portions of Respondent's brief that do not cite to the record 
should not be considered. The portion of the Respondent's brief that is not supported by the 
record should be stricken. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 23 rd day of July, 2013. 
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